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In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of 
unemployment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we first develop a theoretical model 
based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999) and 
Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints 
not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. 
We then provide an empirical illustration based on a country panel dataset of 20 OECD 
countries. Our results suggest that credit market imperfections significantly increase the 
persistence of unemployment. 
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An important stream of literature has dealt with the incidence of credit market imperfections
on the level of unemployment (see e.g. Acemoglu (2001) or Wasmer and Weil (2004)). The
underlying idea is that unemployment may be worsened by frictions outside the labor market,
frictions in the credit market being one of them. However, the way credit frictions inﬂuence the
transitional dynamics of unemployment remains an open question. In this paper, we argue both
theoretically and empirically that credit constraints not only increase the steady-state level but
also the persistence of unemployment.
Our theoretical argument is developed within a simple matching model àl aMortensen and
Pissarides (1999) and Pissarides (2000). Wages are exogenous and workers lend their savings
to representative banks. Building new jobs requires capital. Entrepreneurs do not have capital
on their own and thereby have to borrow from banks. Absent credit market imperfections, en-
trepreneurs create jobs until congestion externalities in the recruiting process make job creation
no longer proﬁtable. Our departure from the standard matching model lies in the introduction
of a credit constraint in the spirit of Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997),
Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) and Matsuyama (2007): entrepreneurs can only borrow a
fraction of pledgeable assets. When the total value of pledgeable assets is too low, job creation
is restricted. The steady state in the constrained regime is therefore characterized by higher
unemployment. Moreover, as unemployment converges to its steady-state value, the number of
jobs changes, aﬀecting the total value of pledgeable assets. Through this channel, the transi-
tional dynamics is slowed down, and unemployment becomes more persistent. In a simulation
exercise, we show that the convergence towards the steady-state employment level is at least
twice slower in a credit constrained economy.
To illustrate this mechanism, we perform an empirical exercise on a panel of 20 OECD
countries, over the 1982−2003 period. Data were drawn from Bassanini and Duval (2006) for the
labor market institutions and Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2000) for ﬁnancial development
variables. We approximate the stringency of credit constraints by the ratio of private credit by
deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions as a percentage of GDP. The lower this
ratio, the more credit constrained the economy. We provide estimations of the unemployment
level where we control for the eﬀects of the one period lagged unemployment and the traditional
labor market factors.1 We ﬁnd that more stringent credit constraints are associated with higher
unemployment. Moreover, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly negative impact of the interaction between
lagged unemployment and our mesure of the stringency of credit constraints. This suggests that
credit constraints not only increase the level but also the persistence of unemployment.
Our contribution follows the literature on the macroeconomic consequences of credit market
1These variables are: the average unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate, the tax wedge, the employment
protection legislation index, the union density index, the degree of coordination of wage bargaining, the product
market regulation index and the output gap.
2frictions. The seminal papers of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)
explain how credit market frictions amplify business cycle ﬂuctuations through a ﬁnancial accel-
erator mechanism. Adopting a longer run perspective, Aghion, Banerjee and Piketty (1999) and
Matsuyama (2007) argue that credit market frictions may generate nonlinear dynamics such as
credit traps, credit collapse, endogenous credit cycles or growth miracles. However, these papers
assume away labor market imperfections, and in particular those generating unemployment.
Acemoglu (2001) suggests that the diﬀerence in credit markets frictions between Europe and
the US can contribute to explain the diﬀerence in unemployment patterns. In his model, credit
frictions inﬂuence the economic outcome through the choice of becoming an entrepreneur. In our
model, credit frictions inﬂuence more speciﬁcally the volume of credit devoted to job creation.
Wasmer and Weil (2004) introduce search frictions in both the labor and credit markets. Their
focus is on the complementarity between the two frictions, not upon the transitional dynamics.
Hristov (2009) calibrates a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model with search frictions
on the labor market, New-Keynesian price staggering and credit frictions due to a costly state
veriﬁcation problem. Simulations show that the introduction of credit frictions magniﬁes the
propagation of shocks and increase the volatility of unemployment.
Our empirical exercise is in line with the literature that investigates the determinants of
unemployment time patterns in OECD countries (see e.g., Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Nickell,
Nunziata and Ochel (2005), Belot and Van Ours (2004), Bassanini and Duval (2006), Bertola,
Blau and Kahn (2007)). In a recent paper, Gatti and Vaubourg (2009) try to assess the impact
of credit market imperfections on the level of unemployment. We depart from their work by
analyzing also the eﬀect of credit development on the persistence of unemployment.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The theoretical model is exposed in Section
II. Section III studies the properties of the steady state and of the transitional dynamics.
Section IV provides an empirical illustration of the impact of credit frictions on unemployment
persistence. Some concluding comments and directions for further research are gathered in
section V.
II The model
We focus on the macroeconomic consequences of credit market frictions. For that purpose,
we develop a theoretical model with very simple forms of credit frictions and of the credit
contract. Following Wasmer and Weil (2004), we assume that agents are exogenously and
perfectly segmented between three categories: workers, entrepreneurs (or equivalently in our
economy “managers”) and banks (or equivalently in our economy “ﬁnanciers”).2 All agents
2Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Aghion et al. (1999) also assume a form
of exogenous separations between entrepreneurs and ﬁnanciers in the credit market. The distinction between
“banks” and “ﬁnanciers” is only meaningful if one wants to investigate the form of the credit contract, which is
beyond the scope of the present paper.
3however have the same preferences. They are risk neutral and discount future at rate 0 over
an inﬁnite horizon. Time is continuous.
Workers are either employed or unemployed. Employed workers receive wage 0.T h i s
wage is assumed exogenous, a simpliﬁcation whose implications will be discussed later on. Un-
employed workers search for jobs and receive no income. All workers deposit their savings in
banks. Since they are risk neutral, their savings are inﬁnitely elastic in the interest rate. Hence
the deposit rate equals their discount rate 0.
Entrepreneurs have no personal wealth, but have the ability to create and manage a large
number of jobs. The creation of a new job requires a once-for-all investment of 0 units
of capital that entrepreneurs have to borrow from banks. Once created, vacant jobs become
productive only after ﬁnding a suitable worker to hire, which takes time. A ﬁlled job produces a
ﬂow of output. Entrepreneurs divide these ﬂows between their own consumption, wages
paid to employed workers and interests  ·  to banks. Finally, jobs are exogenously destroyed
at rate 0, in which case the initial capital  is dissolved.
The deposit rate is , while the lending rate 0 is continuously renegotiated. Competition
among banks is perfect so they make no proﬁt.
II.1 The matching process
Let  be the number of employed workers.  also equals the number of ﬁlled jobs. The total
m a s so fw o r k e r si sn o r m a l i z e dt o1,s ot h e r ea r e1− unemployed workers searching for a job. Let
 be the (endogenous) number of vacant jobs. Entrepreneurs search for suitable workers to ﬁll
their vacancies, which is time-consuming. Instead of describing in details these search activities,
we summarize the macroeconomic outcome of the matching process by a function (1 −  )
that expresses the ﬂow of hiring per unit of time as a function of the numbers of unemployed
workers and vacancies (Diamond (1982), Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Pissarides (2000)).
We assume () is increasing and concave with respect to both arguments and exhibits constant
returns to scale.3 We in addition assume () is continuously diﬀerentiable over R2
+.
Let  = (1 − ) denote the tightness on the labor market. The rate at which a va-
cancy meets a worker is given by (1 −  ) = (11)
def
≡ ().F r o mt h ea s s u m p t i o n s
we made about the matching function, we deduce that () is a decreasing and diﬀerentiable
function of . Symmetrically, the rate at which an unemployed worker exits unemployment is
(1 −  )(1 − )=(). This rate is an increasing and diﬀerentiable function of .J o b s
are dissolved exogenously at rate 0 for sake of simplicity. The evolution of the employment
level (the number of ﬁlled jobs) is driven by the diﬀerence between employment inﬂows and
outﬂows:
˙  = () · (1 − ) −  ·  (1)
3See Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).





This curve, labelled (BC) hereafter, is upward-sloping and convex in the () plan (see Figures 1
and 2). When the economy lies on the left (resp. on the right) of the BC curve, the employment
level is low (high) so employment outﬂows are lower (higher) than inﬂows. Consequently 
increases (decreases), so the economy moves rightwards (leftwards).
II.2 Entrepreneurs
A ﬁlled job produces a ﬂow  of goods, costs a ﬂow  of wages and  ·  of reimbursement to
banks. The value  of a ﬁlled job for an entrepreneur veriﬁes the asset equation:
 ·  =  −  −  ·  −  ·  + ˙  (3)
A vacant job neither yields cost nor gain. It is ﬁlled at the Poisson rate ().T h ev a l u ev of
a vacancy thus veriﬁes the asset equation:
 · v = ()( − v)+ ˙ v (4)
II.3 Banks
When a bank is in contact with a ﬁlled job, it receives a ﬂow  ·  of reimbursement. Since the
job is dissolved at the Poisson rate 0 and the bank ﬁnances itself at rate ,t h ev a l u e for
ab a n kt ob ei nc o n t a c tw i t haﬁlled job veriﬁes the asset equation
 ·  =  ·  −  ·  + ˙  (5)
When a bank is in contact with a vacant job, the latter is unable to pay back its debt until the
job becomes ﬁlled. Therefore, the value v of a bank to be in contact with a vacant job veriﬁes:
 · v = ()( − v)+ ˙ v (6)
Perfect competition in the banking sector decreases the lending interest rate  until the zero-
proﬁt condition v − =0in the banking sector is met. This last condition pins down v = 








Summing (3) and (5) gives
( + )( + )= −  + ˙  + ˙ 
+ equals the total value of a ﬁlled job for the bank and the entrepreneur. It yields a constant
proﬁt that equals output  minus wage  and is dissolved at rate . This equation featuring
forward-looking variables is unstable. Assuming away bubbles implies at each point in time:





There are two conditions on the job creation.
1. Assume that creating a vacant job induces a once-for-all disutility cost  ≥ 0. The net
gain of creating a job should be nonnegative, so v ≥ . If this constraint is binding, then







This expression combined with (7) and (8) gives :
 − 
 + 







When this condition is binding, it deﬁnes a tightness level independently of the employment
level, as in Mortensen and Pissarides (1999). Hence in the () plan, this curve is
horizontal. Below, tightness is lower, so  is higher than  and entrepreneurs want to
create more vacancies.
2. The second condition comes from the fact that creditors value their loans even in the case
where entrepreneurs deviate from their on-equilibrium behavior. Indeed, the job value in
case of default is crucial since it aﬀects the amount of credit banks agree to provide. There
may be diﬀerent contracting frictions between banks and entrepreneurs that may explain
why default values matter.4 Discussing these is beyond the scope of our paper. When
entrepreneurs default, we assume banks become managers of the jobs. However, they have
a much lower ability in that activity compared to entrepreneurs and have a comparative
disadvantage in hiring workers with respect to managing ﬁlled jobs. To study in the
simplest possible way the consequences of this type of credit frictions on unemployment
dynamics, we assume the maximum level of credit ( + ) that can be supplied in the
economy equals a fraction 1 of what banks get in case of default. The latter amount is
nothing else than the total value of ﬁlled jobs  · ( + ). Hence,
 ·  · ( + ) ≥ ( + ) where  ≥ 1
The higher , the less stringent the credit market. In the limit case where  tends to
inﬁnity, entrepreneurs are not credit constrained any longer. Using  = (1 − ) and (8),












4These frictions can be justiﬁed by the possibility of strategic default by the entrepreneur, renegotiations,
moral hazard, costly state veriﬁcation and so on.
6Whenever (9) and (10) do not bind, entrepreneurs ﬁnd proﬁtable to create additional va-
cancies and are able to borrow additional credit. The number of vacancies then instantaneously
rises, pushing tightness  upwards. Entrepreneurs thus create vacancies until one of the two
constraints binds. So one must have at each point in time:




( + )( + )














The ﬁrst term in the right-hand side does not depend upon employment, while the second
increases with employment. Therefore, in the () map, Equation (11) can be depicted by a
curve which is ﬁrst increasing (corresponding to the constrained regime) and then horizontal
(corresponding to the unconstrained regime) (See the curves labeled JC in Figures 1, 2 and 3).
If the credit constraint (10) is not binding, Equation (9) holds with equality, which determines
 at each point in time, thereby at the steady state. Then the level of employment converges to
its stationary value according to (1) in an auto-regressive fashion. The speed of convergence is
given by  + ().
Assume now that the credit constraint is binding. Equation (10) then deﬁnes an upward-
sloping and convex relationship in the () map, which tends to 0 as  tends to 0 and tends to
∞ when the economy converges to full employment. At a credit-constrained steady state, using









The left-hand side of (12) increases in , so this equation admits at most5 one solution in .
Moreover, at this solution, tightness  increases with productivity  and the parameter  of the
ﬁnancial constraint, and decreases with wage  and capital .
In Figures 1, 2 and 3, the steady-state of the economy corresponds to an intersection between
the BC curve and the increasing part of JC curve. When productivity  increases or when wage
 and capital  decrease, the JC curve shifts upwards, as depicted in Figure 1. When ﬁnancial
market improves (so that  increases), only the increasing part of the JC curve shifts upwards, as
illustrated by Figure 2. When the disutility cost  for the entrepreneur of creating an additional
vacancy decreases, only the ﬂat part of the JC curve shifts upwards, as illustrated by Figure 3.
To be consistent with the comparative statics properties of the credit-constrained steady state
deﬁned by Equation (12), the BC curve has to be steeper than the increasing part of the JC
curve. At an intersection between the BC curve and the JC curve, the former is always steeper,
whether or not the intersection corresponds to the credit-constrained part of the JC curve. This
5Recall that  () is decreasing in  over R
+
∗ . Let us denote  =l i m
7→∞
 () and  =l i m
7→0
 (),w i t h0 ≤    ≤
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Figure 1: Comparative statics in ,  and  and steady-state stability.
has two consequences. First, apart from the trivial  =  =0steady state, there exists at most6
one steady-state equilibrium. Second, since the economy lies at each point in time along the JC








Figure 2: Comparative statics in 
We now examine whether unemployment is more or less persistent when the credit constraint
(10) is binding. Since the job creation condition under credit constraint (10) holds at each point
in time, plugging (10) into (1) leads to (see Appendix A):
 ˙ 

= −( + ()) + (1 − ()) ·
()

6To ensure existence, one has to assume in addition to the conditions given in Footnote 5, that
 − 
 + 






This further restriction ensures the existence of a tightness level such that job creation is proﬁtable and the









Figure 3: Comparative statics in 
where ()=−0 () () ∈ (01) denotes the elasticity of the matching function () with
respect to the stock of unemployment. Using (2) around a steady state leads to:
 ˙ 

= −() · ( + ()) (13)
Thus, employment converges at a lower rate to its steady-state value when the economy
is credit constrained. To understand why, let us denote by ∗ ()=()( + ()) the
level of employment which equilibrates labor inﬂows and outﬂows, conditional on a tightness
level. When tightness  is constant, which is the case in the unconstrained regime, employment
converges in an autoregressive fashion towards its stationary target ∗ (). Conversely, in the
constrained regime, tightness  increases in , as a rise in employment increases the stock of
secured assets in case of default. Then, when employment is below (above) the ∗ () target,
employment increases (decreases) for the same “ﬂow-rebalancing” reason as in the unconstrained
regime. However, this increase (decrease) in turn implies an increase (decrease) of the ∗ ()
target. As a matter of fact, the convergence towards the steady state is delayed, explaining why
employment will converge at a slower pace in the constrained regime.
To ﬁx ideas on how much important is the persistence diﬀerence between the two regimes,
we notice that around the steady state, the speed of convergence is given by  + () in the
unconstrained regime and ()( + ()) in the constrained regime. According to Petrongolo
and Pissarides (2001), ()=0 5 is the most plausible value for the elasticity of the matching
function. Hence, the speed of convergence towards the same steady state (i.e. with the same
) would be twice smaller under credit constraints. Moreover, since the constrained regime is
associated with lower values of tightness, the speed of convergence would be even slower. A little
calibration exercise can illustrate this reasoning. We consider two economies with the same given
level of initial employment and the same calibrated steady-state employment. The ﬁrst economy
is credit-constrained in the sense that vacancy creation is driven by (10). The second economy
9is not credit constrained, so that tightness is permanently at its steady-state level given by (9).
We then compare the transitional dynamics of employment in the two economies.
The calibration exercises are done on an annual basis, and aim at matching the french
economy. The matching function is assumed to be of the following symmetric Cobb-Douglas




2. The job destruction rate is set at  =0 10,s ot h ea v e r a g e
duration of employment is 10 years. Targeting a steady-state unemployment level of 9% and an
average vacancy duration of 6 weeks (Maillard 1997) gives the scaling parameter of the matching





We then simulate transitional dynamics by solving (1). In the credit-constrained case, tightness
is given by  =0 866 
1− according to (10), whereas in the absence of credit constraints, tightness
is permently set at its steady-state value ∗ =8 76.



















Figure 4: Simulated transitional dynamics
Figure 4 displays the transitional dynamics of employment  and tightness  for these two
economies, starting from an initial unemployment of 10% (i.e.,  inially equals 090). It takes
about 8 years for tightness in the credit-constrained economy (solid line) to reach its steady
state. While it takes about 15 year in the unconstrained economy (dashed lines) to achieve
45th of the adjustment, the corresponding delay is about 3 years in the constrained economy.
This ratio with a magnitude order of 05 matches our previous theoretical ﬁnding: the ratio
between speeds of convergence around the steady state equals the elasticity of the matching
function.
In this exercise, we have assumed that wages are ﬁx e da ta ne x o g e n o u sl e v e l.I n a n e n -
dogenous wage setting framework, wages would typically be increasing in tightness (See e.g.
Pissarides 2000). Hence, wages would be constant along transitional dynamics of the uncon-
strained economy. In the constrained case, wage would presumably increase along transitional
dynamics, thereby decelerating even further the adjustment of tightness and employment. This
suggests that endogenizing the wage setting would reinforce our mechanism.
We are therefore conﬁdent that credit constraints have an important quantitative impact on
unemployment persistence.
10IV Empirics
In this section we investigate empirically, on macro-panel data, the impact of credit market
imperfections on the level and persistence of unemployment. The analysis is carried out on 20
OECD countries7 over the period 1982-2003. Data were drawn from Bassanini and Duval (2006)
for the labor market institutions and Beck et al. (2000) for ﬁnancial development variables.8
IV.1 Estimated models
To test whether credit market imperfections increase unemployment persistence, we compare
the estimates of the following ﬁve equations.9
 = −1 +  +  +  +  (14a)
 =  +  +  +  +  (14b)
 = −1 +  +  +  +  +  (14c)
 = −1 +  + \  × d −1 (14d)
+ +  +  + 
 = −1 +  + \  × d −1 (14e)
+ [  × d −1 +  +  +  + 
where  is the aggregate rate of unemployment, −1 the lagged rate of unemployment
and  is a vector of standard unemployment determinants in the literature. It here includes
the average unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate (), the degree of coordination of wage
bargaining (), the union membership rates () ,t h et a xw e d g e( ), the degree
of employment protection legislation (), the average degree of stringency of product market
regulation (), and the OECD measure of output gap () which particularly aims at
controlling for the unemployment eﬀects of aggregate demand ﬂuctuations over the business cycle
(see e.g., Bassanini and Duval (2006)). Country-ﬁxed eﬀects  capture unobserved heterogeneity
between countries, while time-ﬁxed eﬀects  control for world trends and business cycle eﬀects.
Equation (14a) is our benchmark where unemployment is only explained by its lagged value
and other standard determinants in the literature. The coeﬃcient  of the lagged value is
therefore an empirical measure of unemployment persistence.
We capture in Equation (14c) the eﬀect of the credit market development on the level of
unemployment by introducing an indicator of the stringency of credit constraints: the share
of private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP (). It
7Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States.
8The deﬁnitions and description of the variables are in Appendix B.
9The constant term is here implicitely included either in the country-speciﬁce ﬀects, or in the time-speciﬁc
eﬀects.
11measures isolated credit issued to the private sector as opposed to credit issued to governments
and public enterprises. Furthermore, it concentrates on credit issued by intermediaries other
than the central bank. It is a measure of the activity of ﬁnancial intermediaries in one of its main
function: channeling savings to investors. The higher this indicator, the less stringent credit
constraints. The ranking of countries’ credit development according to this variable is available
in Appendix C. Credit market frictions may have a steady-state eﬀect on unemployment which
is captured by coeﬃcient . As credit and lagged unemployment variables may be strongly
correlated, we use Equation (14b) to assess how parameters in Equation (14c) are aﬀected when
lagged unemployment is dropped.
We introduce in Equation (14d) an interaction term between credit market imperfection and
lagged unemployment. Let and  be respectively the means of unemployment rates and
of the share of private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP
over the whole sample. We deﬁne d −1 = −1−and \  = − as the
deviations from the mean of these two variables. The coeﬃcient  thus speciﬁcally captures how
credit market imperfections inﬂuence unemployment persistence, net of their eﬀects on steady-
state unemployment. As a matter of fact, Equation (14d) is the central one for our empirical
analysis.
Finally, we evaluate in Equation (14e) how parameters in Equation (14d) are aﬀected when
the inﬂuence of employment protection legislation on unemployment persistence (captured by )
is also taken into account. Indeed, we theoretically (cf. Pissarides 2000 ) expect  to reduce
both employment inﬂows and outﬂows. Equation (14e) therefore veriﬁes whether estimates of 
in (14d) do not spuriously capture the eﬀect of .
Since we exploit similar OECD data for labor market institutions, we follow Bassanini and
Duval (2006) and use the Generalized Least Square estimation method allowing for heteroscedas-
tic errors. Doing so, we are also consistent with the methodology of Nickell et al. (2005), on a
diﬀerent set of data.
Institutional variables  and  are time-varying. Changes in unemployment may
cause potential policy reactions that would aﬀect these variables. Because causality may run on
both directions, these regressors may be correlated with the error term, generating simultaneous
biases. To deal with these econometric issues we also adopt an instrumental approach, estimating
our central Equation (14d) using both the standard Two-Stage Least Squares method, and the
Arellano-Bond (1991) diﬀerence GMM estimator.
IV.2 Main results
The main results of our estimations are displayed in Table 1. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a tt h ee s t i m a t e d
coeﬃcient  for the one-period lagged unemployment variable (−1)i ss i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero at the 1% level with the expected positive sign, suggesting a strong persistence of
12Table 1: Empirical results
Dependent Variable: 





























































































Instruments No No No No No
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 369 369 369 369 369
Estimate coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level if ***, 5% if **, 10% if *
Student T-statistics are given in brackets beneath the coeﬃcients.
Nota:  and  respectively stand for the means of −1 and 
13Table 2: Instrumentation Equation (14 d)
Dependent Variable: 
Instrumental Variables estimates





























































Instruments No Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes









Observations 369 369 369
Estimate coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant at the 1% level if ***, 5% if **, 10% if *
Student T-statistics are given in brackets beneath the coeﬃcients.
Nota:  and  respectively stand for the means of −1 and 
2SLS estimation:
Instrumented variables :  and \  × d −1
Instruments : −1, −2,  −1,  −2, −1, , , ,
   ,  ,  and country dummies
Arellano-Bond diﬀerence GMM estimation:
GMM-type instruments: −3   −1   −2(\ −1 × d −2) (\ −2 × d −3)
Standard instruments: ∆ ∆−1 ∆  ∆−1 ∆, ∆ ∆
14unemployment. This result is very robust across speciﬁcations and consistent with Nickell et al.
(2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2006).
Second, we ﬁnd a negative coeﬃcient  for the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP (). We interprete this coeﬃcient as inversely
related to the stringency of credit constraints. Let us notice, however, that  would not be
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in speciﬁcation (14c). Estimates from speciﬁcation (14b) suggest
an explanation: when −1 is dropped,  appears to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero,
at the 1% level. This suggests that  would aﬀect the unemployment level directly, but
also indirectly via its link with −1.Therefore our theory predicts that an increase in 
would signiﬁcantly reduce the unemployment level. The estimated coeﬃcient  is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 10% level for speciﬁcation (14d), with the expected negative sign.
In speciﬁcation (14d), we ﬁnd negative estimates  for the interaction term between 
and lagged unemployment −1. This suggests that the ratio of private credit by deposit
money banks to GDP would signiﬁcantly reduce the unemployment persistence at the 1% level,
an evidence in line with the predictions of our theoretical model. Speciﬁcation (14e) conﬁrms the
robustness of this result, controlling by the inﬂuence of employment protection on unemployment
persistence.10
The estimated vector  of parameters associated to standard unemployment determinants
in the literature appears quite robust from speciﬁcations (14a) through (14e). Regarding la-
bor market institutions, the average unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate ()a n dt h e
high-corporatism index ()w o u l da ﬀect the level of unemployment in a signiﬁcant way,
with the expected signs (respectively positive and negative). A more generous beneﬁt system
would tend to increase the level of unemployment, while a higher degree of coordination in
wage-setting (as in Scandinavian economies, for instance) would reduce it. These results are
consistent with Nickell et al. (2005) and Bassanini and Duval (2006). Moreover, they seem
particularly robust to the introduction of our credit market development variable. The eﬀect
of union density () on unemployment does not seem very signiﬁcant here. The tax
wedge () appears as a signiﬁcant factor of unemployment increase, which is in accordance
with previous theoretical and empirical research. Employment protection legislation (),
whose theoretical eﬀects on unemployment are ambiguous (since it can decrease both unemploy-
ment entry and exit) appears to lower unemployment. The coeﬃcient associated with rigidities
in the goods market ()i ss i g n i ﬁcantly positive, which is consistent with previous re-
search. Rents and other non-competitive features on the product market would tend to increase
unemployment. The output gap measure ()w o u l ds i g n i ﬁcantly reduce unemployment.
This index is computed as the diﬀerence between the actual output of an economy and its ”full-
10It is worth noticing that estimates in Equations (14a), (14c), (14d) and (14e) correspond to contemporaneous
eﬀects, whereas estimates in Equation (14b) rather capture a long run eﬀect. Given that estimates of the au-
toregressive coeﬃcients  in Equations (14a), (14c), (14d) and (14e) are close to 34, one should approximately
multiply by 4 estimates of  and  to compare them with the corresponding estimates in Equation (14b).
15capacity” production potential, and thus has a negative sign. A negative coeﬃcient associated
with  implies that a reduction in the output gap reduces the unemployment level. This
result is perfectly in line with Bassanini and Duval (2006). The introduction of  and
\  × d −1 would not destabilize to a considerable extent estimates of coeﬃcients .
We now deal with possible endogeneity issues, using instrumental approaches. Table 2 ﬁrst
provides estimates of speciﬁcation (14d) using the two-stage least squares (2SLS) methodol-
ogy. Reverse causality problems may potentially concern all variables in the right-hand side
of (14d). However, since our particular focus is on credit market imperfections, we choose to
be parcimonious and only instrument  and \  × d −1. The associated ﬁrst-stage
within regressions are available in Appendix D. Table 2 also displays estimates of Equation
(14d) using the Arellano and Bond (1991) diﬀerence GMM. Interestingly, these two types of IV
regressions provide consistent estimates as regards the inﬂu e n c eo fc r e d i tm a r k e ti m p e r f e c t i o n s
on unemployment persistence.
The Sargan test evaluates regressor exogeneity for a panel data ﬁxed-eﬀects regression es-
timated via instrumental variables in which the number of instruments exceeds the number of
regressors: that is, for an overidentiﬁed equation. If the associated p-value is equal or greater
that 10%, we can consider that the instruments are valid and not correlated to the error term,
with a 10% error risk. According to this criterion, the regressions in Table 2 would display valid
instruments, with a 10% error risk. Moreover, when the p-value associated to the Arellano-
Bond test for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation is lower than 1%, and the p-values for higher-order
autocorrelation are greater than 10%, we can conclude that disturbances in level equations are
not autocorrelated with a 1% error risk, which means that appropriate instruments for the dif-
ferenced equation are third and subsequent lags of . Our Arellano-Bond GMM estimation
passes this test, which gives conﬁrmation to the validity of our instruments.
To sum up, our instrumental estimations give further support to our quantitative ﬁndings. As
additional checks for robustness, all our regressions were run on subsamples ignoring alternatively
each country from the panel. We also performed estimations of speciﬁcation (14d) by removing
alternatively each component from the vector  of standard unemployment determinants.
These estimates, available upon request, tend to conﬁrm our argument.
VC o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we argue that credit market imperfections impact not only the level of unemploy-
ment, but also its persistence. For this purpose, we ﬁrst develop our theoretical argument in a
simple model based on the equilibrium matching framework of Mortensen and Pissarides (1999)
and Pissarides (2000) where we introduce credit constraints. We show these credit constraints
not only increase steady-state unemployment, but also slow down the transitional dynamics. We
then provide an empirical illustration based on a macro-panel dataset of 20 OECD countries.
16Our results suggest that credit market imperfections would signiﬁcantly increase the persistence
of unemployment.
Some directions for further research naturally follow. First, we want to consider alternative
measurements for the stringency of credit constraints. Second, we aim at generalizing the
analysis to the case of endogenous job destruction. Third, we plan to investigate how the
analysis would change with diﬀerent other credit constraint speciﬁcations. We intend to pursue
these projects in the soon future.
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18Appendix
A Unemployment Persistence under credit constraints
Deriving (1) along the credit constrained regime where  is given by JC gives:
 ˙ 










· (1 − )






= −( + ()) + ()(1− ()) ·


where the second equality follows the derivation of (JC) and the last one from (JC)
BD a t a s o u r c e s , d e ﬁnitions description
Aggregate unemployment rate ()
Deﬁnition: Unemployed workers in the age group 15-64 as share of the labor force (in %).
Source : Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Average unemployment beneﬁtr e p l a c e m e n tr a t e()
Deﬁnition: Average unemployment beneﬁt replacement rate across two income situations
(100% and 67% of APW earnings), three family situations (single, with dependent spouse, with
spouse in work) and three diﬀerent unemployment durations (1st year, 2nd and 3rd years, and
4th and 5th years of unemployment).
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
High corporatism ()
Deﬁnition: Indicator of the degree of centralization/coordination of the wage bargaining
processes, which takes values 1 when wage bargaining is highly centralized or coordinated and
0 otherwise.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006
Union density ()
Deﬁnition: Trade union density rate, i.e. the share of workers aﬃliated to a trade union, in
%.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Labor tax wedge ()
Deﬁnition: Tax wedge between the labor cost to the employer and the corresponding net
take-home pay of the employee for a single-earner couple with two children earning 100% of
19APW earnings. The tax wedge expresses the sum of personal income tax and all social security
contributions as a percentage of total labor cost.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Employment protection legislation ()
Deﬁnition: OECD summary indicator of the stringency of Employment Protection Legisla-
tion.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Product market regulation ()
Deﬁnition: OECD summary indicator of regulatory impediments to product market compe-
tition in seven non-manufacturing industries. The data cover regulations and market conditions
in seven energy and service industries: gas, electricity, post, telecoms (mobile and ﬁxed services),
passenger air transport, railways (passenger and freight services) and road freight.
Source Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Output gap ()
Deﬁnition: OECD measure of the gap between actual and potential output as a percentage
of potential output.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
Private credit by deposit money banks and other ﬁnancial institutions to GDP ()
Deﬁnition: CRE equals claims on the private sector by both deposit money banks and other
ﬁnancial institutions divided by GDP. It measures isolate credit issued to the private sector as
opposed to credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Furthermore, it concentrates
on credit issued by intermediaries other than the central bank. It is a measure of the activity of
ﬁnancial intermediaries in one of its main function: channeling savings to investors.
Source: Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2001.
Public Ownership ()
Deﬁnition: PUBOWN is a component of the OECD Product Market Regulation Index. It
measures the scope of public enterprise, the size of public enterprise, special voting rights and
the control of public enterprise by legislative bodies.
Source: Bassanini and Duval 2006.
20Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the analysis
Variable Mean Standard
deviation
Minimum Maximum Number of
observations
UR (%) 7.76 4.27 0.45 24.04 369
ARR (%) 29.88 12.82 0.35 64.94 369
CORP 0.54 0.50 0 1 369
UNDENS (%) 39.04 20.57 8.6 83.73 369
TW (%) 28.24 9.0 6.40 45.5 369
EPL 2.01 1.1 0.2 4.19 369
PMR 3.68 1.29 1.05 6 369
OGAP -0.68 2.40 -10.72 6.30 369
CRE 0.94 0.39 0.25 2.11 369
PUBOWN 3.77 1.41 0.74 6 369
CR a n k i n g c o u n t r y






















21DF i r s t - s t a g e ﬁxed-eﬀects (within) regressions
Table 5: Instruments used in the 2SLS estimates: ﬁrst-stage regressions
Dependant Variable:



















































Time dummies yes yes
Country dummies no no
Observations 369 369
22